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THESIS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUGAR BOUNTIES
bY.
J. T . GORHAM
CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
-1891-

In 1890 it was enacted by congress, "That on and after
July first,eighteen hundred and ninety-oneand until July
firstnineteen hundred and five,ti-ere shall be paid,from any
moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,under the
provisions of section three thousand six hundred and eighty-
nine of the Revised Statutesto the producers of sugar test-
ing not less than ninety degrees by the polariscope,from beets,
sorghum,or sugar-cane grown within the United Statesor from
maple sap produced within the United States,a bounty of two
cents per pound; and upon such sugar testing less than ninety
degrees by the polariscope,and not less than eighty uegrees,
a bounty of one and three-fo ths '"cents per pound,under such
rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue,wuith the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,shall
prescribe."
This act became a law.
It is the pi;rpose of this paper to inquire into
the constitutionality of that law.
In this inquiry little or no reference will be
made to authorities. The point involved has never been ju-
dicially passed upon. Commentators,jurists,statesnmen,politic-
ians and laymen have given expre3sion to conflicting opinions.
Most of these avarrant a suspicion of prejudice,and arouse
in the investigator no little doubt of sincerity. The safe-
est course seems to be to give them all a fair examination,
and with the light thus secured strive for a conclusion in
harmony with institutions which we deem indispensible. Our
results must not endanger the existence of a constitutional
government,nor of a republican form of government.
Congress has no power except that conferred by
the federal constitution. Its powers are enumerated in the
eight section of article one. Here we find eighteen clauses,
under none of which save the first can authority for this act
be found. Were the words "general welfare" stricken from the
first clause the act could not be justified there. Hence
these terms are the center from which will be made an attempt
to determine relations.
The first clause of section eight article one is
as follows: "The congress shall have power
1. To lay and collect taxes,duties,imrosts and excisesto pay
the debt,and provide for the comon defence and general wel-
fare,of the United States;but all duties,irrposts,and excises,
shall be uniform throughout the United States."
The only portion of this with which we are concerned
is: "The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
..0 to ... provide for the general welfare of the United
States. "
Does this confer upon congress the power to grant
sugar bounties? is the question to be answered.
It is convenient to pursue this discussion under
three heads:
1. The relation of the terms "general ,*elfare" to the clause
in which they occur.
2. Their relation to the succeeding clauses of section eight
article one.
3. The extent of the power conferred Wy the terms,conceding
for the purpose that they are not intrinsically devoid of all
power.
First. What is the meaning of the woi'ds "general wel-
fare" within the first subdivision of section eight article
one,without reference to the succeeding subdivisions?
For the purposes of the matter under consideration,
this subdivision consists of two parts,the tax clause and the
general welfare clause. Whatever is said of the relation of
the word tax to the terms general welfare will also apply to
the relation between that word and the words "debts" and "com-
mon defence.1" Since that is true the presence of those words
can in no wise modify the discussion and will therefore re-
ceive no further consideration.
In the early history of our constitution it was
thought by many that the tax and the general welfare clauses
were independent of each other. This view is now practically
abandoned. It is concedednay urged,byr the greatest commenta-
tors and jurists that the tax and general welfare clauses are
not coordinatebut that the latter is dependent upon the for-
mer;it limits the taxing power,and this limitation is univer-
sally expressed by saying that a tax must be for a public pur-
pose. The terms "public purpose" alrays appear in the leini-
tion of taxand the power of taxation given to the states is
always subject to this limitation.
The act in question provides that the bounties be
paid out of whatever money there may be in the United States
Treasury. This money is raised by taxation and must be used
for a public purpose. The question to be answered then is,is
money used in the payment of sugar bounties used for a public
purp o se?
The exact scope of the terms public purpose has
never been satisfactorilly settled. They have been talked
about; somethings not falling within their meaning have been
pointed out,but an exact definition has never been attempted.
Perhaps the only statement in respect to them that has been
universally accepted is,that they include those purposes for
which governments are established. It would hardly be urged
that one of the purposes of government is the production of
sugar.
In respect to their public or private character
there is certainly no difference between the sugar industry
and a vast number oi' other industries which are equally gen-
eral and essential. If the government can stimulate or re-
strict the production of sugar it can legislate in like man-
ner with reference to any other articleagricultural or manu-
factured,within the United States. And if it can aid at all
the:-e can be no logical limit to its authority short of absol-
ute control. It is not a question of degree. The power either
exists or it does not. And if it exists there is nothing in
the constitution that can possibly be construecd as a limita-
tion upon its exercise.
If the sugar industry is priblic,it is no easy mat-
ter to point out a private industry. There are but few that
are more foreign to the objects of government.
The state courts have invariably held legislative
acts,enabling municipal corporations to bond themselves for
the purpose of aiding in the production of articles of com-
merce,unconstitutional on the ground that it was taxing for
private purposes. There is probably not a single exception to
this in any of the states.
Acts authorizing a tax,to construct a uan across
a river to increase the water power;to loan credit to manu-
facturers;to build bridges and for other internal improve-
ments;and to aid an educational, institution have been held
unconstitutional on the same grounds in iTinnesota,West Vir-
ginia,]'ansas and Wisconsin respectively.
The states are not so harmonious in their decis-
ions of cases involving public aid to rail roads. It may safe.
ly be said that a majority of the states in which the ques-
tion has arisen has pronounced such aid constitutional,the
rail road being regarded as a quasi public corporation,and
the purpose a Public purpose. The leading majority case is in
Pennsylvania,the opinion by Judge Black,and the leading min-
ority case is in Michigan,the opinion by Judge Cooley. It is
significant that three years after the decision in Pennsyl-
vania the people of that state adopted an amendment to their
constitution forbidding such aid to rail road and other cor-
porations.
While a great many cases 1ave held acts authoriz-
ing aid to rail roads constitutional,no doubt a majority of
the stateseither by express organic law or by judicial decis-
ion,are committed to the policy which does not regard money
used for the aid of rail 2-oads as employed for a public pur-
pose.
The people of each state in the Union have confer-
red upon the state the power of taxation. Every state that has
said anything upon the subject has said that to aid in the
production of any article,manufactured or agricultural is an
unwarranted use of that power. The people of the United States
have in their constitution conferred upon the government the
power of taxation,but to employ that power for the purpose of
aiding in the production of articles of consunption is an in-
consestancy without justification.
Secondly. The relation of the general welfare clause to
the subsequent specifically enumerated powers. On the one
side are the strict constructionists who contend that the gen-
eral 'velfare clause is a general statement of powers thereaft-
er enumerated and is no broader than those powers. On the
other hand,the liberal constructionists maintain that this
clause is a substantive grant of power. . Strong centraliza-
tion is the watch word of the liberal constructionifts.
Alexander Hamilton was the first to declare that the words
general welfare were the most comprehensive that could be
found and for that reason they were used. It is not unreasona-
ble to assume that the construction put upon the constitution
by Hamilton was the one most in accord with the form of gov-
ernment he advocated. The scheme of government submitted by
him to the convention of eighty seven gave to congress the
power "to legislate upon all subjects whatsoever." His execu-
tive and upper house were chosen for life. These are features
which we now believe to be incompatible with liberty itself.
The followe-.s of 11amilton,the liberal constructionists,advocaf
a construction which inevitably tends towarc the form of gov-
erment for which he strove.
Judge Story,who was not a strict constructionist,
says that should the general velfare clause be given a mean-
ing bnoader than the subsequent clauses "the constitution
would practically create an unlimited national government.
The enumerated powers would tend to embarrassment and confu-
sion,since they would only give rise to doubts as to the true
extent of the general power or of the enumerated powers."
It is insisted that a construction which robs the
terms "general welfare" of intrinsic power virtually reads
those words out of the constitution. This is not quite true.
We have seen that they limit the taxing power. Those who
would give to them an additional meaning claim that to be one
of their functions. But they serve another purpose. What is
more common in legal literature than the definitions of terms
used. When wo 'ds having both popular and technical meanings
are employed it is important that their exact scope should be
specifically stated. If this is not done much confusion is
sure to follow. Had a few terms in the Statute of Uses been
defined,it would have more nearly accomplished its intended
10.
purpose.Is it not likely then, that that "most august assembly
that ever met in America," after conferring the power to pro-
mote the general welfareat once proceeded to state what they
meant by those terms? Nothing is more consistent nor reasona-
ble than this: The conrress shall have rower to lay and col-
lect taxes, wherewith to provide for the general welflare which
it may do by borrowing money on the credit of the United
Statesregulating commerce with foreign nations etc.
Any other construction would render sixteen sub-
divisions of section eight,article one superfluous. Legisla-
tion under every one of the enumerated po'.ers would either
promote the commonA or general welfare. Then why enumerate
these particular ones if there are others? An explanation of
this partiality has never been ventured.
We must not forget that ours is a constitu-
tional government. Its limitations are definitely prescribed.
The bounds of such a government must not be uncertain. The
costly experiences of the founders of our republic lead them
to leave no half conceded sources of power. Such are always
fraught with danger.
Should all the force of which these two words are
11.
capable be given them,there is no end to the disasters and
absuraities that might overtake us. Granted that congress
might pass any law that would promote the general welfare,and
such an act as this might easily appear on the Statute book:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled that all
menwhose income from invested funds is more than is reasona-
bly sufficient for their supportshall bestow the surplus of
such income upon worthy persons of small means in such manner
as the law may direct." This would be an admirable law. It
would not deprive the capitalist of abunance. The evils which
follow in the train of vast and unnecessary private fortunes
would be lessened. The deserving needy would be succored and
the undeserving would be induced to mend their ways. Surely,
such a law would promote the general welfare. And what is still
more important no one would be deprived of a mite who was not
abundently able to bear the loss. To be sure,the property of
one individual would be taken anu given to another,but that is
exactly what the sugar bounty law does,and that too in a less
equitable way,for it takes from all and gives to a few who are
by no means needy.
12.
It is more than a hundred years since our constitu-
tion was adopted. During this reriod volumes have been filled
with aecisions upon close constitutional questions. Of all
the cases that have heretofore come before the courts ques-
tioning the power of congress never has an act been defended
on the ground that it promoted the "general welfare". Nothing
could be more reasonable than to put all acts on that ground
if authority for them elsewhere was in any wise uncertain.
Thirdly. Conceding the general welfare clause to be a
substantive grant of power,what is the scope of that power?
If these words confer any power by virtue of their
intrinsic meaning,the exercise of that power,on the face of it,
must be by the enactment of a law which will promote the gen-
eral or common welfare. Now in order that the conmon welfare
may be promoted the law must be general in its application and
those subject to its operation must as a whole be benefit-
ted by it. This law is not general in its application either
as to territory or persons.
An attempt is made to generalize the law by includ-
ing in its provisions three very dissimilar products,sugar-
canethe maple tree and the sugar beet. There are a great
many states in the union where none of these articles are
13.
produced,and owing to the natural characteristics of the
states never can be produced profitably. Sugar-cane at the
present time is confined almost exclusively to the state of
Louisiana,beets are produced in a few of the iorthwestern
states and the maple tree is rare outside of a few Northern
states. There are states in which it is reasonably certain
these articles can never be produced. But should the law ex-
tend to every state in the union the method employed to accom-
plish this end is of doubtful validity. A law affecting the
cotton plant could hardly be made general by extending it to
sheep because both are the source of cloth. If a law can be
generalized in this way there need be no such thing as a spec-
ial law for it can be made general by attaching it to a gener-
al law and enacting the whole at one time. In this way the
constitutional prohibition is evaded. It would seem that when
a law is enacted relating to sugar produced from sugar-cane,
if sugar-cane cannot be the product of every state in the
union,the citizens of these states in which it can be produc-
ed are the recipients of advantages or disadvantages which the
citizens of other states can neither enjoy nor suffer as the
case may be,and the law is special no matter what may be
14.
attached to it besides.
The sugar botuty act not only is local but it,af-
fects very few in the localities where it does operate. The
manufacturer of sugar, alone is the recipient of these bounties
The laborer in the beet field will receive no higher wages as
S result of this law. It cannot increase wages generally and
the beet grower will not voluntarily pay two dollars per day
where laborers in similar industries can command but a dollar
and a half. Nor will the beet raiser receive a greater price
for his beets. The market in which he disposes of his products
is and always has been beyond his control.
A law then which is in the nature of things,confin-
ed to a few localities and which reaches but a few in those
localities directly,can hardly be said to be general either b~T
territoral extent or direct application. Its indirect effect
will be considered further on.
The fact that no other law of this kind has ever
been passed should not be ignored. It throws a great deal of
light on the views held by former statesmen concerning cons-
titutional authority for such a law. The reasons for such laIs
were more urgent in the past than now. During the first half
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of the present century our relations with other nations were
by no means uniformly amicable; capital was not abundant and
large capitalists were few in number; safety in transportation
was not reasonably assured; and there but few established in-
dustries in the United States. Under such circumstances con-
gress would naturally resort to the most effective means in
its power to develop natural resources and establish and in-
dustrial independence. In the face of these r conditions
a subsidy would not be the last thing thought of. It is sim-
ple,direct,efficient. Great industries can be established and
maintained by it,and if the government takes absolute control
it is possible that no one will suffer unduly. But during the
first hundred years of our constitutional life,convenient as
it often would have been,not once were bounties granted to
promote the general welfare. Laws having a like effect have
frequently been enacted on other grounds. In the last decade
of the eighteenth century an act was passed granting to fish-
ing vessels certain bounties. The bounty did not depend upon
the amount of fish caught but upon the capacity of the vessel,
and was distributed among the sailors and owner of the vessel.
Its purpose was to encourage citizens to learn the art of
16.
seamanslhip and is justifiable unc..er* "to provide anK, maintain
a navy. " This was the nearest congress ever cumne to passing
a law like the present.
"Drawbacks" are not bounties. In allowing them con-
gress merely sars, "If you bring a foreign product to our
shores,en -age our artizans to convert it into i manufactured
article aid then return itwe will tax you less for the favor
conferred than if you us the aticle."
Does this law promote our wielfare as a nation? Con-
ceding for the purpose of argument that congress has power to
legislate in any manner,with reference to anything not forbid-
den br the constitution that will promote the general welfare,
does this law meet those conditions?
There are three waysin one or more of which the
act may accomplish this result if at all:
1. The price of sugar to consumers may be reduced without a
corresponding burden beimg imposed.
2. It may increase the wages of laborer's.
3. An industry may be established that will increase our ma-
terial prosperity and further our commercial independence as
a nation.
17.
In the consideration of these three points it must
be borne in mind that the people of the Umiited States are tak-
en as a whole. And the question always is,are the people as a
whole -Gainers? Neither must the fact be lost sight of that
whatever adds to our wealth in a sense promotes the general
welfare. But the constitution must attach a relative signifi-
cation to these words if it attaches any at all. The criter-
ion is not,has wealth been created by virtue of the law's ex-
istence? but,has labor been more profitably directed than it
otherwise would have been? It might here be parenthetically
stated that a subsidy is a confession that adverse conditions
do exist and that the same amount of labor applied in some
other industry,or applied elswhere in the same industry would
produce greater results.
First. The price of sugar to the consumer requires but
a moments notice. It is axiomatic to say that the American
people as consumers will save no more on the cost of their
sugar than as the tax payers they payout. Were it otherwise
it is apparent that the material welfare of a people could be
increased at pleasure by the extension of the bounty system.
The bounty is supposed to represent the difference between
the cost of production in the United States and other coun-
18.
PJU
tries. HenceAmerican consumer cannot procure the domestic
article any cheaper now than the foreign can be supplied to
him,and he has to pay the bouanty besides. Barring all other
considerations,the American as a consumer is cdecidedly a loser
under the existing law.
Secondly. As has already been pointed out this act nei-
ther increases the wages of the laborer nor otherwise betters
his condition. The laborers employed by th, se aho .wiill receive
these bounties are but a small proportion of the American
workmen. The wages received Dy the larger number of workmen
will inevitably regulate the wages of the smaller. Should
some industry prosecuted by ordiniary labor be so favored
that its employees could be paid five dollars per day,while
laborers in other pursuits commanded but two dollars per day,
the competition would be such that the former would be forced
to work for two dollars also unless three dollars were added
gratuitously. Only a phrenologist dare calculate on the phil-
anthropic bump of commercial man. So the laborer's wages are
not increasedbut he must pay his share of the bounty,and
still get his sugar no cheaper than foreign nations would sup-
ply it.
19.
Thirdly. Will this act establish an industry and ren-
der us more independent commercially?
Could this be answered in the affirmative it would
furnish the strongest grounds for the constitutionality of the
act. In fact there are no other grounds on which it can be put.
But even to get down to the argument of this point it is nec-
essary to concede two very important points upon one of which
great authorities are divided: first that the general wel-
fare clause is a substantive grant of power and secondly that
the money paid out in bounties is used for a public purpose
and will justify the levy of a tax.
The argument of this point wouId carry us into a
discussion of the whole protective theory,for the bounty is a
substitute for a protective tariff and is designed to accom-
plish the same purpose. It is impossible within the limits of
this paper to enter upon an extended discussion of this ques-
tion. The statement of a few facts must suffice.
This act will no doubt tend to establish a sugar
industry. But the question naturally arises why should such an
industry be encouraged if it is not self supporting? It cannot
be disputed that in case of war it would be to our advantage to
20.
have all the means of support within our own borders. As a
war rtaasure the sugar bounty act is justifiable. If put on
that ground it may be justified under the constitution as in-
volved in the war making power. But we are at peace with the
whole world. Our dependence upon any nation in time of peace
or war is not likely to be greater than that nation's depend-
ence upon us. Then why legislate with reference to the conner-
cial independence of the United States. This nation cannot con
s-mne all its products and is forced to seek foreign markets.
If we trade with other nations we must take those things which
other nations have to offer. There are countries with which we
cannot compete in the production of sugar. Why not exchange
for the sugar of these countries,articles which we are better
fitted to produce.
It would be presumptuous for anyone to affirm that
the establishment of an industry did or did not advance the
material welfare of a people. There are candid thinkers on
both sides. But in the face of the facts stated it may well be
doubted whether the additional cost of domestic sugar does not
outweigh all contingent benefits.
It may be urged that if it once be conceced that
21.
the general welfare clause is a substantive grant of power,
what will promote the general welfare is a question of policy
and the will of congress is supreme in deciding that question.
The preponderence of authorities unquestionably hold that
view,and therein lies the danger of giving the clause any in-
dividual force. If such meaning be given the clause the only
limitation upon the powers of government,with the exception
of the express prohibitions,is the discretion of congress.
This in reality would confer upon congress the express power
to do certain specific things and anything else it might con-
ceive to be good. Such indefinite and comprehensive power is
certainly out of harmony with the popular understanding of th2
limitations interposed by our constitution.
In order to uphold the constitutionality of this act the
sugar industry must be pronounced a public industry;the genei -
al welfare clause must be held to confer powers limited only
by the discretion of congress,and seventeen enumerated powe"'s
to serve no purpose but that of confusion; and that the pay-
ment of seven million dollars per annum for the privilege of
buying sugar at the same price it can be furnished by other
nations, does,although we may not be able to see it,further our
material well-being.

